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PURPOSE OF THE STUDY  
The issue of audit quality currently sits at the top of the financial reporting policy agenda (eg, 
FRC, 2006a; 2007, 2008).  The audit process involves interactions (ie, discussions and 
negotiations) between the audit team and client company directors and staff.  At senior level, 
these interactions determine the content of the published financial statements and hence impact 
on the overall integrity of the financial reporting process and capital market confidence.   
 
This briefing reports findings from a survey of the three principal parties (finance directors/chief 
financial officers (CFOs), audit partners (APs) and audit committee chairs (ACCs)), part of which 
explores their role in the audit interaction process. The data was collected between June and 
September 2007 and therefore relates to the current UK regulatory environment.  In this briefing 
we report on the extent, nature and outcomes of financial reporting interactions which took place 
involving the three parties. 
 
BACKGROUND 
In 1995, we undertook a similar investigation sending a questionnaire to CFOs and APs of UK listed 
companies (Beattie, Fearnley and Brandt, 2000).  The auditing and financial reporting environment 
has changed radically since then. The failure of Enron in the US in 2001 was a major shock and 
led to the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002.  Since then, similar reforms have been 
adopted in Europe and elsewhere (Oxley, 2007; Quick et al, 2007).  Although audit committees 
have been a longstanding feature of UK corporate governance, their role has been strengthened. 
The UK’s Combined Code on Corporate Governance incorporated the recommendations of the 
Smith Report (2003) on the role of audit committees.   The Financial Reporting Council (FRC, 
2005) produced detailed guidance about the role and responsibilities of the audit committee 
regarding financial reporting (paragraphs 4.1-4.4) and the external audit process (paragraphs 
4.16-4.38). International Auditing Standard (ISA (UK and Ireland) 260 (APB, 2004)) requires the 
auditor to communicate in a timely manner to those charged with governance in the company 
about audit matters. The ISA 260 requirements mirror some of the provisions in the Combined 
Code but they make compliance mandatory for auditors, whereas the Combined Code requires 
companies to comply or explain.  
 
Other significant UK changes include:  the mandatory adoption of International Financial 
Reporting Standards (IFRS) for the group accounts of listed companies throughout the EU for 
December 2005 year ends; more rigorous ethical standards for auditors; the adoption of 
International Standards of Auditing (ISAs) (UK and Ireland) for December 2005 year ends; and 
independent inspection of public interest audits by the Professional Oversight Board.  
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 Consequently, new variables have emerged that are likely to influence audit interactions and 
moderate the influence of others.  The audit committee is now expected to have a significant role 
in the relationship between the company and the auditor. 
 
 
RESEARCH APPROACH 
A questionnaire was sent to CFOs, ACCs and APs of domestic, officially listed UK companies, 
(excluding AIM companies and investment trusts) asking (among other matters) about their recent 
experience of discussions and negotiations on 35 financial statement issues. The sample covered 
the top 250 qualifying companies by market capitalisation (as at 5 February 2007) and a systematic 
sample of 250 from the remaining qualifying companies.  To eliminate multiple selections of ACCs, 
the final sample sent out to this group was reduced to 446.  
 
To identify suitable APs acting as engagement partner for qualifying companies and facilitate the 
distribution of the questionnaire, we were assisted by 11 large audit firms.  The firms identified 439 
listed company APs who were asked to respond with reference to their largest listed client within the 
scope of the study.  
 
For each financial statement issue that had been the subject of discussion and/or negotiation in 
the most recent financial year respondents were asked:  
• which parties were involved in the discussion (defined as: matters raised by one 
 or more participants and considered in speech or writing); 
• whether the discussion became a negotiation (defined as: the process of 
 reconciling conflicting views advanced in discussion, by concessions by one, two 
 or all participants);  
• whether the discussions or negotiations resulted in a change to the proposed 
accounting numbers or disclosures;  
• whether the issues discussed led to:  the possibility of a qualified audit report; 
consideration of or actual auditor change; or a third party opinion being sought.  
 
The following overall useable response rates were obtained: CFOs 30%; ACCs 29%; APs 50%. The 
characteristics of the three respondent groups are broadly comparable, although the ACC group 
contains a slightly higher proportion of FTSE 250 companies than the other two groups. 
 
 
KEY FINDINGS 
 2
Key findings are grouped under four headings: discussion issues; negotiation issues; change to 
the financial statements (separated into change to accounting numbers and change to 
disclosures); and events triggered by key issues.  Tables 1 to 4 show the ten most frequently 
cited issues for each group.  The tables are ordered on the CFO group; issues ranked outside the 
top ten are shown in square brackets.  Table 5 presents the incidence of significant events 
triggered by these interactions.  
 
1. Discussion issues 
Table 1: Top 10 discussion issues 
 
% indicating discussion 
took place (n=) Rank 
 
Issue 
CFO 
(149) 
ACC 
(130) 
AP 
(219) CFO ACC AP 
Intangible assets/goodwill 62.4 58.5 59.4 1 1 3 
Issues in subsidiary undertakings 61.1 53.1 71.2 2 8 1 
Segmental reporting 57.7 49.2 54.8 3 9 5= 
Deferred tax assets/liabilities 56.4 43.8 51.1 4 [12] 9 
Presentation of  the primary financial 
statements 55.7 57.7 63.9 5= 2= 2 
Business review 55.7 53.8 55.3 5= 6= 4 
Revenue recognition 53.0 53.8 54.3 7= 6= 7 
Exceptional items 53.0 57.7 49.3 7= 2= 10= 
Fair value on acquisition 49.0 57.7 49.3 9= 2= 10= 
Liabilities/provisions 49.0 55.4 53.0 9= 5 8 
Share based payments 44.3 42.3 54.8 [12] [13=] 5= 
Financial instruments 38.9 45.4 43.4 [13] 10= [12]
Directors’ remuneration report 37.6 45.4 40.6 [14] 10= [14]
 
 
The top 10 discussion issues are shown in Table 1.  What is immediately apparent is that there is 
a very high level of agreement among the three groups on the most discussed issues – 
approximately half of each group discussed the same issues.  Issues arising from business 
combinations dominate the list. Intangible assets/goodwill, issues in subsidiary undertakings and 
fair value on acquisition also feature highly. This may be because IFRS 3 requires the fair value 
of the cost of the combination to be allocated to the various identifiable components, such as 
brands and customer lists, and the accounting treatment is different from that of goodwill.  A 
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recent study for the European Commission found that one third of companies do not provide a 
description of the components (ICAEW, 2007).    It also revealed that many preparers had doubts 
that the costs involved in valuing individual intangibles were justified. This may explain the high 
level of discussion on this issue.  
  
Presentation of primary statements and exceptional items are both ranked highly (even more so as a 
negotiation issue).  The FRRP has already made clear its view that additional line items in the 
income statement may be included when this is necessary to explain elements of financial 
performance, but such changes should be justifiable (FRRP, 2006). It is possible that this high level 
of discussion is related to the format of the income statement.  
 
Overall levels of discussion reported by each of the participating groups are broadly similar, with 
ACCs being as aware of the issues as the other groups.  This contrasts with the findings of 
Beattie et al (2000) where APs reported higher levels of discussion than CFOs. Additional 
comments in response to open questions on the survey were generally positive regarding the 
impact of audit committees on the process: 
‘By the audit committee, in substance, setting the terms for the auditors on behalf of the 
shareholders, the audit committee are better informed by the auditor and in a better 
position to question the quality of the audit.  The auditors are relieved of the problem of 
inappropriate time pressures or compromises with management.’ ACC 428 
 
‘I see the AP/CFO/ACC as a threesome working to a common objective – we watch each 
other but primarily to protect each other’s backs.’ ACC 440  
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2. Negotiation issues 
 
Table 2: Top 10 negotiation issues 
 
% indicating negotiation took 
place (n=) Rank 
 
Issue 
CFO 
(149) 
ACC 
(130) 
AP 
(219) CFO ACC AP 
Presentation of  the primary financial 
statements 12.1 6.9 14.6 1 4= 6
Exceptional items 9.4 9.2 16.9 2 2 2
Issues in subsidiary undertakings 8.1 6.9 19.2 3= 4= 1
Revenue recognition 8.1 5.4 13.7 3= 6= 8
Segmental reporting  7.4 4.6 12.8 5= 8= 9
Liabilities/provisions 7.4 5.4 15.5 5= 6= 4=
Intangible assets/goodwill 6.7 7.7 16.4 7 3 3
Financial instruments 6.0 3.1 7.8 8= [13=] [12=]
Deferred tax assets/liabilities 6.0 1.5 14.2 8= [21=] 7
Fair value on acquisition 5.4 10.0 15.5 10= 1 4=
Business review 5.4 2.3 10.0 10= [19=] 10
Inventories 3.4 4.6 4.6 [14=] 8= [17=]
Identification of pre/post acquisition 
expenses 0.7 4.6 2.7 [25=] 8= [22=]
 
 
The top 10 negotiation issues are shown in Table 2.  Only one financial statement issue is cited by 
at least 10% of CFOs (presentation of the primary financial statements) and only one issue (fair 
value on acquisition) is cited by at least 10% of ACCs.  By contrast, 10 issues are cited by at least 
10% of APs.  Thus, APs report substantially higher incidence of negotiation than either ACCs or 
CFOs. This phenomenon was also noted in the previous study (Beattie et al, 2000).  The most likely 
explanations are either that the APs’ concerns regarding audit quality result in them having different 
perceptions regarding their involvement in negotiations and the impact on financial statements.  
Alternatively, it may be because the role of an AP is focused on the production of audited financial 
statements, whereas ACCs and CFOs have a broader range of responsibilities.  
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The issues most frequently negotiated are similar to the issues most frequently discussed for all 
three groups, although ACCs place inventories and identification of pre/post acquisition expenses in 
the top ten negotiation issues, well above the other respondents. The issues that rise significantly in 
the negotiation rankings are: for all three groups – US GAAP reconciliation issues; for ACCs – 
inventories, property, plant and equipment, leases and identification of pre/post acquisition 
expenses; and for APs – prior year adjustments. 
 
It is surprising that financial instruments, the IFRS standards which have been heavily criticised, do 
not appear higher in the rankings, although several respondents made adverse narrative comments 
about IAS 32 and 39.   
 
While direct comparisons with the previous study (Beattie et al, 2000) are not possible due to 
differences in the scope of the work, there are indications that the proportion of discussions which 
evolve into negotiations has declined.  Some possible explanations for this were provided by 
narrative comments.  
‘We work through the year to identify and resolve issues and new policies as we go; the 
result is that if there are no surprises, the need for ‘negotiation’ is avoided.  This is what 
has happened.’ AP 44 
 
‘I don’t recognise negotiation as part of the audit committee process.’ ACC 440 
 
Beattie et al (2000) did note that levels of negotiation were lower for companies with audit 
committees.  In 2007 virtually all listed companies have audit committees and their role is more 
clearly defined, so it would be expected that negotiation is rarer.  Their presence appears to 
impose a structure on the audit process that largely precludes last minute negotiation to clear an 
issue. 
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3. Change to the financial statements 
 
Table 3:  Top 10 issues resulting in change to the accounting numbers 
 
% indicating change to the 
accounting numbers took 
place (n=) Rank 
 
Issue 
CFO 
(149) 
ACC 
(130) 
AP 
(219) CFO ACC AP 
Deferred tax assets/liabilities 7.4 4.6 13.7 1= [13=] 4=
Share based payments 7.4 6.9 7.3 1= 5 9
Exceptional items 6.7 6.2 12.8 3 6= 7
Revenue recognition 6.0 8.5 15.1 4= 2= 3
Intangible assets/goodwill 6.0 7.7 13.7 4= 4 4=
Issues in subsidiary undertakings 5.4 6.2 26.9 6= 6= 1
Retirement or other employee benefits 
(eg, pension schemes) 5.4 5.4 5.9 6= 9= 10=
Financial instruments 5.4 5.4 9.6 6= 9= 8
Liabilities/provisions 4.7 5.4 13.7 9= 9= 4=
Prior year adjustments 4.7 6.2 4.6 9= 6= [14=]
Fair value on acquisition 4.0 10.0 18.7 [11=] 1 2
Issues in associates or joint ventures 4.0 8.5 2.7 [11=] 2= [19=]
Presentation of the primary financial 
statements 2.7 5.4 5.5 [14=] 9= [12=]
Segmental reporting  2.7 2.3 5.9 [14=] [18] 10=
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Table 4: Top 10 issues resulting in change to the disclosures 
 
% indicating change to the 
disclosures took place (n=) Rank 
 
Issue 
CFO 
(149) 
ACC 
(130) 
AP 
(219) CFO ACC AP 
Presentation of the primary financial 
statements 17.4 9.2 31.5 1 2= 1
Segmental reporting  16.8 9.2 21.0 2 2= 4
Business Review 15.4 9.2 24.2 3 2= 2
Issues in subsidiary undertakings 12.1 6.9 23.7 4 9= 3
Exceptional items 11.4 10.0 16.9 5 1 6
Intangible assets/goodwill 9.4 8.5 16.4 6 5= 7=
Financial instruments 8.1 7.7 15.5 7 7= 10
Deferred tax assets/liabilities 7.4 3.8 16.4 8= [16=] 7=
Directors’ remuneration report 7.4 5.4 16.0 8= [11] 9
Liabilities/provisions 6.7 4.6 11.0 10= [12=] [14]
Retirement or other employee benefits 
(eg, pension schemes) 6.7 4.6 13.2 10= [12=] [12]
Issues in associates or joint ventures 6.0 7.7 5.0 [12=] 7= [19=]
Fair value on acquisition 4.7 8.5 18.7 [14=] 5= 5
 
The top ten issues resulting in change to the accounting numbers are shown in Table 3, while the 
top ten issues resulting in change to the disclosures are shown in Table 4.  In both tables, the 
same set of issues that featured at the top of the discussion and negotiation tables are at the top 
of the change to financial statements tables (albeit with slightly different emphasis).  A notable 
exception to this is share-based payments (introduced for the first time by IFRS 2), which sit high 
in the change to accounting numbers table and did not feature in the negotiation table.  Other 
exceptions are retirement or other employee benefits and prior year adjustments.  The directors’ 
remuneration report, always a sensitive issue, appears in the change to disclosures table.  
Deferred taxation heads the list of issues resulting in changes to the accounting numbers.  This is 
always a subjective area and was ranked in the top six in the previous study (Beattie et al, 2000).   
ICAEW (2007) confirms that, in the transition to IFRS, deferred tax had caused more 
restatements than any other issue.  
 
As with the negotiation issues, APs frequently report higher levels of change to the financial 
statements than either of the other two groups. The exception to this is issues in associates or 
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joint ventures, which ranks very highly for ACCs in the change to accounting numbers table 
relative to the other groups.  
 
Segmental reporting features strongly as an issue causing a change to accounting disclosures.  
IAS 14 requires greater disclosure (particularly of segment assets and liabilities) than the old UK 
equivalent (SSAP 25) and this may have been resisted by companies on grounds of commercial 
sensitivity.   The enhanced business review has been introduced for year ends beginning after 1 
October 2007, but many companies may have been preparing for this event in advance and were 
discussing content with their auditors, hence the relatively high ranking. 
 
While changes to the financial statements may occur after the relevant issue has been 
negotiated, this is not invariably the case.  Respondents have cited many examples of discussion 
being linked to a change.  A ‘normal’ progression from discussion to negotiation to changes to the 
accounts cannot be assumed and frequently the interactions are more complex. 
 
4. Events triggered by the most important issues 
Table 5:  Events triggered by the most important issues 
 
 No. of reported  
cases 
Event Combined 
groups 
CFOs ACCs APs 
Possibility of a qualified audit opinion 44 7 1 36 
Second opinion sought from third party 
(eg, lawyer, regulator other audit 
firm) 
56 11 13 32 
Change of auditor considered 23 7 3 13 
Actual change of auditor 4 1 3 0 
 
 
Respondents were also asked whether any of the issues they considered the most important had led 
to consideration of a qualified audit report, seeking an external second opinion, or the possibility or 
actuality of an auditor change.  Responses are summarised in Table 5.  CFOs and ACCs were 
aware of the possibility of a qualified audit report in only eight instances, compared to 36 for the APs.   
Going concern was the most common issue cited with five instances (although strictly under ISAs 
this would result in an ‘emphasis of matter’ audit report rather than a qualification).  This suggests 
that CFOs and ACCs were less aware than the auditors of how close they may have been to a 
qualification or an emphasis of matter paragraph.  
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External second opinions were sought from a third party on 56 occasions, with intangible 
assets/goodwill (6 instances) being the most common issue.  Auditors sought external opinions more 
frequently than company directors. This may be attributable to the changes in the ethical codes 
whereby auditors cannot provide certain types of service to their clients.  
 
Auditor change was considered on 23 occasions.  Surprisingly, APs were more frequently concerned 
about the possibility of their client seeking auditor change than client companies actually considered 
changing.   Actual auditor change occurred only four times.  Narrative comments gave an indication 
of why auditors might believe they were likely to be removed: 
‘Technical advice/input more limited or ‘qualified or ‘disclaimed’ for fear of regulatory non-
compliance, a frustration to the client.’ FD 340 
 
 ‘Challenges of interpreting IFRS have put a strain on relationship due to need to involve 
technical department.’ AP 50 
 
‘Less involved in providing commercial advice to clients on impact of changes in 
accounting standards for fear of breaching ethical standards.’ AP 516 
 
These comments suggest that the revised ethical standards and the other recent changes in the 
regulatory framework may have placed a much greater emphasis on compliance and changed 
the relationship between the CFO and AP.   
 
 
CONCLUSION 
This research suggests that changes to the regulatory environment over the last ten years have 
impacted on the way that key participants in the audit process interact with one another.  ACCs 
emerge as an integral part of the process, although it is not possible from a survey to identify 
exactly how their role differs from that of the CFO. 
 
The existence of audit committees with a clearly defined role may have created a more formal 
structure which has made negotiation less common, and encouraged earlier recognition and 
agreement of issues.   
 
There is a high level of interaction between all three parties on specific financial statement issues 
and this appears to be linked to issues relating to IFRS standards.  There is also a high level of 
agreement among respondents as to which issues have been discussed/negotiated/caused 
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changes to financial statements.  These have tended to be where IFRS has introduced significant 
change, particularly goodwill and intangibles, deferred taxation and presentation of primary 
statements.  
 
The most surprising finding is the auditors’ concerns about being removed from office and the 
extent to which auditors seek external opinions.   
 
We conclude that auditors and audit committee chairs are making a significant contribution to 
financial reporting outcomes in the present UK environment.   
 
DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
Additional analysis will be undertaken into which of the three parties was involved in each  
interaction and whether this varies across interaction issues.  The impact (if any) of audit firm and 
company characteristics upon the nature and outcomes of the interactions will also be examined 
(eg, audit firm type, audit firm tenure, audit partner tenure, industry sector, Stock Exchange 
group, US listing, and audit committee financial experience).  In addition, further follow-up 
qualitative research is underway. Interviews are being carried out with all three parties in 10 
companies. This evidence will explore the nature and process of the interactions and also provide 
more understanding of the key issues identified in the survey. The interviews will also test existing 
models of the interaction process (eg, the grounded theory model of Beattie et al, 2001) and 
develop this model to reflect changes in the financial reporting and auditing environment. 
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